Unfortunately bad things can happen to good people. My heart goes out to this unsuspecting 57 year old Chula Vista woman who innocently became an acquaintance with and befriended Valdez, who in turn and according to the news accounts betrayed a good citizen and human being.
Author Archives: Caroline Anderson - Senior Support Specialist
Missouri v. McNeely
“On September 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Missouri v. McNeely, (Case No. 11-1425) https://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-1425.htm granted a Writ of Certiorari and will likely decide early next year in their scheduled 2012-2013 docket whether a law enforcement officer must first get a warrant before taking a blood sample from a suspected drunk driver who has not previously given consent.
The underlying trial court ruled the warrantless blood sample violated the defendant’s Constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure. The State appealed and the decision was reversed. The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court of Missouri where the State continued its argument of the “exigent circumstances exception” to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution warrant requirement, on the grounds that alcohol quickly dissipates in the bloodstream while police must wait for a warrant. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this contention and supported the trial court’s holding.
The American Civil Liberties represented the driver who was charged with a DUI. Among other things, the ACLU noted there are 27 states that ban nonconsensual blood samples from being taken without a warrant. However, California is not included in any such ban per the case of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which not only addressed the Fourth Amendment, but also ruled the withdrawal of blood is not a violation of one’s privileged against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.”
SAM SPITAL
State Supreme Court Denies Latest Appeal by Man Convicted of Murdering Three Boys
“This August 30, 2012 article described a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by a death row inmate for the murder of three young boys in the summer of 1975. The California Supreme Court unanimously denied the appeal, noting the 521 page Petition is an example of the abusive practice by prisoners and/or their lawyers consuming endless time for the Court to review otherwise frivolous and untimely appeals.
The Associate Justice wrote in the Court’s opinion there was overwhelming evidence the defendant was guilty of killing the three boys, and that ‘he forcibly sodomized one victim (possibly after he was dead) and that he represented a continuing threat to the safety of children in the neighborhood (inferable from the discovery by police that petitioner possessed hundreds of photographs of young children).’ The Defendant had admitted to the police he had gone to a park in Los Angeles County to take pictures of young boys, and confessed to slitting the boys’ throats, as well as admitting he choked the 7-year-old boy (the son of a family friend) after he asked to leave the defendant’s apartment where he planned to take nude photos of him, according to a previous 1995 ruling from the California Supreme Court.
The Court further stated: ‘Some death row inmates with meritorious legal claims may languish in prison for years waiting for this court’s review while we evaluate petitions raising dozens or even hundreds of frivolous and untimely claims.’ The task of a seasoned criminal appeal lawyer in handling such cases is extremely time-consuming. However, they usually are recognized if not commended by their genuine focus on both the facts and the law in a succinct and compelling manner, far different than many who claim or believe they know what they are doing and simply ramble, failing to present and/or articulate legally sound arguments.”
– Samuel Spital
Barnes v. State of Indiana
“In the case of BARNES vs. STATE OF INDIANA, the Indiana Supreme Court on May 12, 2011, held there is no right to unreasonably resist an unlawful entry by law enforcement officers. The Court argued public policy favors rejecting the fundamental and 300 years of precedent English common-law right to be safe and secure in our residence and to reasonably resist the unlawful entry of police officers. In part, the Court based its ruling on the fact allowing one to resist law enforcement unlawful entry unnecessarily escalates the level of violence and harm and, therefore, the risk of injuries to all parties involved….”
J.D.B. v. North Carolina
On June 16, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark case of J.D.B. v. North Carolina, Case # 09-111121, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11121.pdf
held police must consider age and school setting when questioning a child and, therefore, whether they are required to give a Miranda warning. This case involved a thirteen year old seventh grade special education student who was removed from his class, and then taken to a closed door meeting with the school Assistant Principal and questioned by police regarding two burglaries. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that children would not reasonably believe they could leave a room when questioned by police in a school setting and, therefore, must be given a Miranda warning. In other words, this type of a setting was deemed overly coercive because children inherently obey authority and are generally under the belief they must remain in the office and answer questions by a school administrator.
Neither the police nor the school administrators first advised the thirteen year old student of (1) his right to remain silent pursuant to the Miranda warning when questioned; (2) that he was free to leave the room; nor (3) was he afforded an opportunity to talk with his grandmother or legal guardian. After questioning for about forty-five minutes, the student admitted to the burglaries. Juvenile petitions were filed against him, and after a hearing the court adjudicated J.D.B. delinquent. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed as did the North Carolina Supreme Court, holding he was not in custody when he confessed to require a Miranda warning. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Certiorari and reversed the judgment of the state Supreme Court. Essentially, children must be given the same Miranda procedural safeguards that are guaranteed to adults.
Smith v. Cain
In the case of SMITH v. CAIN, the U.S. Supreme Court on January 10, 2012 (Case #10-8145), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-8145.pdf reversed the Decision of the Louisiana State Trial Court, which erroneously convicted the defendant of first-degree murder based upon the testimony of a single witness. At trial, the only witness to link the defendant to the crime untruthfully claimed he was face to face with the defendant during the initial moments of an armed robbery, and identified Smith as the first gunman to come through the door when two other gunmen entered the residence in question. There were no other witnesses and no physical evidence to implicate the defendant in the crime.
During a state post-conviction proceeding, the defendant obtained police files containing exculpatory statements by the eyewitness that contradicted his trial testimony, which evidence was not disclosed by the prosecution in the Discovery they provided to the defendant’s counsel. The police investigator’s notes made at both the time of the murder as well as five days later contained statements by this sole witness that he could not supply a description of the perpetrators other than they were black males, as he could not see their faces and further that he would not know any of them even if he saw them. The notes were so damaging to the prosecution it was a clear travesty of justice for the prosecution to have failed to provide this evidence to the defense. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded the prosecution’s failure to disclose those statements violated the legal precedent established in the 1963 case of Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, which held due process bars a State from withholding evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.
Perry v. New Hampshire
In the case of PERRY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE, the U.S. Supreme Court on January 11, 2012 (Case #10-8974 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-8974.pdf), affirmed the Decision of the New Hampshire State Supreme Court, holding eyewitness identification that was not procured by unnecessarily suggestive circumstances by law enforcement is not a violation of Due Process and, therefore, cannot be held inadmissible in court. In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court held a preliminary judicial determination to assess the reliability of an out-of-court eyewitness identification was not required before admitting such evidence at trial. The Court held:
“The Constitution protects a defendant against a conviction based upon evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit. Only when evidence “is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice,” Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342, 352 (internal quotation marks omitted), does the Due Process Clause preclude its admission. Contending that the Due Process Clause is implicated here, Perry relies on a series of decisions involving police-arranged identification procedures. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293; Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377; Foster v. California, 394 U. S. 440; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188; and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U. S. 98. These cases detail the approach appropriately used to determine whether due process requires suppression of an eyewitness identification tainted by police arrangement. First, due process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary. Id., at 107, 109; Biggers, 409 U. S., at 198. Even when the police use such a procedure, however, suppression of the resulting identification is not the inevitable consequence. Brathwaite, 432 U. S., at 112-113; Biggers, 409 U. S., at 198-199. Instead, due process requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether improper police conduct created a “substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Id., at 201. Reliability of the eye witness identification is the linchpin” of that evaluation. Brathwaite, 432 U. S., at 114. Where the “indicators of a witness” ability to make an accurate identification” are “outweighed by the corrupting effect” of law enforcement suggestion, the identification should be suppressed. Id., at 114, 116. Otherwise, the identification, assuming no other barrier to its admission, should be submitted to the jury. Pp. 6-10. “
People v. Nelson
The California Supreme Court in the case of People v. Nelson, (#S181611, 01/12/2012), https://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S181611.PDF, held the custodial written confession of the defendant, a 15 year old who was tried as an adult, was properly admitted at trial and, therefore, did not invalidate his conviction of the murder of a 72 year old woman and five first degree burglaries. The California Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal that had previously reversed the Superior Court murder and burglary convictions.
In the underlying case, Orange County Sheriff Investigators at the outset of their custodial interrogation apprised this juvenile suspect of his right to remain silent and right to counsel, and it was established there was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of these Miranda rights. During the course of several hours of interrogation, however, the issue was whether the defendant’s multiple requests to speak with his mother were sufficient to become a post invocation of Miranda. If so, the officers were required by law to halt the interrogation and the defendant’s confession should not have been admissible at his trial. There were multiple requests to speak to his mother that were permitted by the investigators, but the defendant was only able to reach and speak with his brother and grandmother.
The California Supreme Court relied upon the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, (1994) 512 U.S. 452, which held once there is a valid waiver ofMiranda rights, any subsequent assertion of the right to counsel or right to remain silent must be articulated in a sufficiently unambiguous and unequivocal manner to stop questioning; in other words, a reasonable law enforcement officer under the circumstances would understand there to be an actual request for counsel rather than possibly one.
Maples v. Thomas
The U.S. Supreme Court on January 18, 2012, in the case of MAPLES v. THOMAS, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, (Case #10-63)https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-63.pdf, reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals, For The 11th Circuit.
In the underlying trial for murder, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death by the Alabama Court. Thereafter, a world-renowned law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, on a pro bono basis filed a Petition for post-conviction relief; it is noteworthy that they contended the defendant’s trial attorneys were inexperienced and incompetent, thereby depriving Maples of effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Later, the two attorneys associated with Sullivan and Cromwell separated from the firm, did not notify Maples and no one else substituted in as attorney. Then, the ruling on the Petition was denied and it was sent to the two former associates of the above law firm. However, none of the lawyers notified Maples and no one filed an official Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. The time deadline to file a Notice of Appeal had since expired. Soon thereafter, the Alabama Assistant Attorney General wrote to Maples and alerted him he could still file a Writ of Habeas Corpus if he did so in a timely manner. At that point, Maples filed various pleadings in the State Courts and thereafter filed a Writ in the Federal District and U.S. Court of Appeals, both of which denied him any relief.
The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished the situation in which a lawyer’s negligence in failing to timely file a Notice of Appeal does not qualify as cause to excuse the error since the attorney is the agent of the inmate. Instead, the Supreme Court reasoned the failure on the part of the two lawyers to notify Maples of their departure from the law firm constituted abandonment and, therefore, sufficient cause or extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of Maples to relieve him of the procedural default in not filing a timely Notice of Appeal.
People v. Jones
In a nine to zero opinion entitled UNITED STATES v. JONES, No. 10-1259, the U.S. Supreme Court, on January 23, 2012, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1259.pdf affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals decision that reversed the U.S. District Court criminal conviction of drug trafficking and conspiracy charges. The Supreme Court confirmed the police conducted a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it attached and monitored a GPS device to a vehicle. Although there was a warrant issued to the Government, it required the tracking device to be installed within 10 days, but it was actually installed on the 11th day. Therefore, it was deemed a warrantless search in violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy, and the District Court should have suppressed the evidence. As a result of the Supreme Court granting certiorari (after the DC Circuit Court previously denied a petition for a rehearing by the Government), the U.S. District Court sentence to life imprisonment that was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals was affirmed. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court did not decide whether installing a GPS device requires a warrant, and if not, whether monitoring a GPS device over a very brief period of time, such as a couple days, requires a warrant.
